Options and Valuation of Property for Federal Tax Purposes by Bowe, William J.
Vanderbilt Law Review 
Volume 2 
Issue 3 Issue 3 - April 1949 Article 13 
4-1949 
Options and Valuation of Property for Federal Tax Purposes 
William J. Bowe 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons, Taxation-Federal Commons, and the Taxation-
Federal Estate and Gift Commons 
Recommended Citation 
William J. Bowe, Options and Valuation of Property for Federal Tax Purposes, 2 Vanderbilt Law Review 
427 (1949) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol2/iss3/13 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, 
please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu. 




In Estate of John Q. Strange,1 there was an agreement between two
brothers, engaged in business in a close corporation, which provided that upon
the death of either, the survivor might acquire the stock of the other upon pay-
ment of $10,000 to his estate. Payment was so made following the decedent's
death. The fair market value of the stock on the date of death was stipulated
to be $238,126.54. The Board of Tax Appeals held that the option price of $10,-
000 was the proper amount to be included in the decedent's gross estate as the
value of his stock.
In Lomb v. Sugden,2 the decedent owned at death a number of shares of.
stock which she bequeathed to her husband as part of her residuary estate.
About a year prior to death she had entered into an agreement with the other
stockholders of the company that none would sell his stock without first offer-
ing it to the other stockholders, who were to have the right to purchase "in
proportion to their then respective common stockholdings" at approximately
$69 per share.3 The controversy involved the question whether the Commis-
sioner might value the stock at its fair market value of $100. It was held that
because of the agreement the decedent could not have secured a greater price
than $69 at the time of her death and, therefore, the value for estate tax pur-
poses could not exceed that sum.
One further case may be noted. In Commissioner v. Bensel,4 a father and
son had become estranged. The father, a majority stockholder, arid the son, an
employee of a corporation, entered into a contract in which the son agreed to
continue to work for the company in return for an option to purchase his fa-
ther's stock at the latter's death at a price which turned out to be considerably
less than the value of the stock at the later date. The option price was held to
fix the value for estate tax purposes.
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University.
1. P-H 1942 TC AMEm. DEc. SERV. II 42,247 (1942).
2. 82 F. 2d 166 (C. C. A. 2d 1936).
3. "It also provided that any stockholder might give away his stock to any of the
other shareholders and, if he died without issue, might bequeath it to any of the other
shareholders and might also bequeath 10 per cent of his holdings to outsiders. If he left
no issue and to the extent that he made no such bequests, his executors or administrators
must offer the stock at the limited price to the other members of the group in proportion
to their stockholdings." 82 F. 2d at 167.
4. 100 F. 2d 639 (C. C. A. 3d 1938).
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These and other cases of like import 5 suggest an investigation into the
present status of the law relating to the effect of restrictive agreements upon
values in the gift and estate tax fields. Close analysis of all the factors involved
in these cases and a study of the judicial landmarks which in recent years have
extended the tax collector's reach beyond what a too literal reading of the
statute might suggest may help in marking the narrow limits within which op-
tion prices may be expected to fix values.
The granting of an option or the transferring of property subject to a
restrictive repurchase agreement will frequently have income, gift and estate tax
consequences. 6 The creation of a binding option may itself be treated as the
receipt of taxable income to the optionee when it is given for services rendered
1
If the transaction is wholly or partly donative in character, gift tax liability may
be incurred.8 Either tax may also be imposed when property already burdened
with sale restrictions is transferred. With respect to the imposition of an es-
tate tax the two situations must be carefully distinguished. Where the property
was acquired by the decedent subject to a repurchase option, the problem is
solely one of valuation, i.e., whether the option price fixes its maximum worth
or merely has a depressing effect on its value. 9 In those cases, however, where
the decedent himself created the option in favor of another, the provision re-
quiring the inclusion in the gross estate of transfers "intended to take effect in
possession or enjoyment at or after.., death" 10 may result in a valuation of the
property which totally disregards the admittedly adverse effects which such re-
sale limitations have.
Restrictions on resale of stock and business interests are especially common
in enterprises where the number of owners is small. Considerations wholly un-
related to tax avoidance have more frequently than not motivated such pro-
visions. Corporate stock sold to employees or members of their immediate
families is frequently subject to repurchase options in favor of the corporation
whenever the employer-employee relationship ceases or efforts are made to
transfer the stock outside the group. Conversely, the discontinuance of em-
ployment may require repurchase by the corporation. Other agreements may
limit resale to outsiders until stockholders have been given a first opportunity
5. In Helvering v. Salvage, 297 U. S. 106, 56 Sup. Ct. 375, 80 L. Ed. 511 (1936)
(an income tax case), Salvage, an employee of Viscose Company acquired 1500 shares
of its stock in 1922 for $100 per share. The market value of the shares at that time was
$1,164.70 per share. The acquisition was made pursuant to an agreement giving the
corporation an option to repurchase prior to 1924 5/7 of these shares at $100 per share.
The Supreme Court held that the fair market value of 5/7 of the shares in 1922 could
not be in excess of $100 per share since the corporation had the right to repurchase them
at that price.
6. Note, 46 YALE L. J. 272 (1936).
7. Cf. Commissioner v. Smith, 324 U. S. 177, 65 Sup. Ct. 591, 89 L. Ed. 830 (1945).
8. INT. REV. CODE § 1002. An option given in consideration of marriage would con-
stitute a taxable gift. Cf. Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U. S. 303, 65 Sup. Ct. 652, 89
L. Ed. 958 (1945).
9. Worcester County Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 134 F. 2d 578 (C. C. A. 1st 1943).
10. INT. REV. CODE § 811(c).
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to purchase. An exact price may be specified, but more usually it is determined
by an application of an agreed formula which omits consideration of intangible
worth. The prime objective is generally to avoid the formidable task of valuing
such interests when good will and other intangible factors are involved.
Valuation constitutes a difficult problem," to be avoided whenever con-
veniently possible. The problem it poses in the estate and gift tax fields is simply
another illustration of the wisdom of utilizing the option device to the extent per-
missible, not to reduce or avoid taxes, but to make the amount of such taxes
reasonably predictable. The variety of factors affecting the value of business in-
terests, except in the relatively small number of companies whose stock is widely
held and frequently traded on stock exchanges, are numberless. The composite
judgment in any specific instance will always -be made up of many imponder-
ables. Satisfactory analysis or articulate reasoning of the appraiser's conclusion
is rare. The end result is always "a conjecture, a guess, a speculation, a
prophecy." 12
Every community in the country has its quota of successful merchants,
manufacturers and businessmen who, as a result of management and planning,
have brought about the growth and expansion of their enterprises to the point
where in any discussion of national industrial or economic problems they fall
within the classification of small business. Each of these enterprises has an in-
dividuality that renders c6mparison with similar companies for the purpose of
finding the common ground which the traditional willing-buyer, willing-seller
test of valuation assumes, a futile gesture. Among these substantial businesses
there is no standardization of policies. Too many decisions have found their
motivating influence in what was dictated by the individual interests of the
owner or small group of owners.
When the owner of such a business first considers the problems involved in
the devolution of his property on death and the impact thereon of estate taxes,
he finds himself in a bewildering labyrinth of uncertainty. His sole substantial
asset is his interest in the business. This must be valued to estimate his estate
and inheritance taxes. The lawyer or accountant whose counsel he seeks, and
the industrial engineer or economist who comes in to aid in the valuation, after
examining all the available data, applying the standard formulas and weighing
the countless imponderables, may suggest a low of $500,000 or a high of $2,-
000,000 and still be within a permissible range for difference of opinions.'3
11. See generally PAUL, FEDERAI ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION § 18.03 (1942);
Wynn, Valuation of the Family Controlled Business for Estate Tax Purposes, 2 VAND.
L. REv. 250 (1949).
12. Commissioner v. Marshall, 125 F. 2d 943, 946 (C. A. A. 2d 1942). "Anyone
who wants to avoid uncertainties from 'value' will have a sad time getting along in this
world. All aspects of living are chancy. We cannot, by the use of a symbol, 'value,' con-
vert the risky into risklessness, Canute restless change out of existence. Businessmen
sometimes pay cash for value which exists only in 'moonshine or dreamland.'"
13. In Estate of Henry T. Sloane, P-H 1944 TC ME.,. DEC. SERV. f1 44,206 (1944),
there was involved an asserted deficiency in estate tac in the approximate amount of
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The difference in his estimated estate taxes, assuming $160,000 of other
assets and excluding consideration of the marital deduction, between the low
and high valuations suggested is $619,000 at present rates. He will need a
minimum of $179,000 and a maximum of $802,000 to meet his estimated death
taxes.14 Unless he makes adequate provisions for this unpredictable sum, the
tax will be paid in costly dollars since the sale of a partial interest in his business,
if this becomes necessary, is almost certain to be at a sacrifice price. Nor is it
economically feasible to purchase insurance to cushion the blow. He would need
not merely $800,000 of insurance to pay the top estate tax of $802,000, but
$1,600,000 since the insurance proceeds themselves become taxable.15 Annual
premiums on $1,600,000 of insurance on the life of a man aged 55 amount to ap-
$3,007,000, a large portion of which was attributable to adjustments made by the Com-
missioner with respect to the values of the stocks of four corporations. The variations
between the Commissioner's determinations and the Tax Court's findings of values were
as follows:
Approximate Values Per Share
As Determined by As Established
Commissioner by the Tax Court
Corp. A., common ........................... $ 35.00 $ 16.00
Corp. A., pfd . ................................ 65.00 37.50
Corp. B., common ............................ 51.00 1.30
Corp. B., pfd . ................................ 100.00 5.00
Corp. B., pr. pfd . ............................. 100.00 30.00
Corp. C., capital .............................. 60.00 28.00
Corp. D., capital .............................. 6,232.00 2,600.00
The above chart was taken from Pierce, The Preparation of a Valuation Case, in 4T1r
ANN. INST. ox FED. TAXATioN 373, 380 (N. Y. U. 1946). See generally, Bunge, Death
Taxes 7nd Closely Held Business, 23 TAXEs 205 (1945).




Less Specific Exemption 60,000
Taxable Estate $600,000





Less Specific Exemption 60,000
Taxable Estate $2,100,000
Estate Tax (including 80% Fed. Credit) $802,000





Less Specific Exemption 60,000
Taxable Estate $3,700,000
Estate Tax (including 80% Fed. Credit) $1,661,000
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proximately $80,000. Assuming he needs $25,000 of income for living ex-
penses, he would require gross income of $600,000 to put this plan into effect at
existing income tax rates.16
His bewilderment will be due less to his inability to reduce or avoid his
share of the tax burden than to its uncertainty and his consequent inability to
make adequate provision to avoid the sacrifice to his business. His problem is
somehow to freeze the value of his business interest, be it high or low; and a
search for the solution to this problem will suggest some exploration of the tax
decisions dealing with the effect on value of options and sale restrictions.
Gir TAXES
When property transferred by gift is subject to resale restrictions, the op-
tion or contract price at which it may be repurchased upon the happening of
some future event will rarely, if ever, fix its value for gift tax purposes. The
existence of the option will normally have a depressing effect on the value of
the prpperty and hence it will be one, but only one, of the many factors to be
considered. The weight to be given it will vary with the circumstances. While
the courts have adopted this approach it is difficult to square with the test of
market value. 17 In the McCann case, 18 a by-law restriction required an em-
ployee-owner of stock to resell it to the corporation on termination of employ-
ment. In addition, the corporation was required to repurchase at a defined book.
value. In limiting the value of shares of this stock transferred by inter vivos
16. Gross Income $ 600,000
Marital Division $ 300,000
Tax on $300,000 247,000
Tax on other $300,000 247,000
Total Tax 494,000
Spefidable Income $ 106,000
Insurance Premiums 80,000
$ 26,000
17. The Income Tax Title of the Internal Revenue Code uses the term "fair market
value," (INT. REv. CODE §§ 111, 112, 113), whereas the Estate (Id. § 811) and Gift
(Id. § 1005) Tax Titles speak only of "value." The difference has been said to be without
significance. PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION § 18.02 (1942). This view
may be justified by the regulations, which provide in all three instances for the test of
market value, the willing-buyer, willing-seller concept. U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 23.111;
U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81,10; U. S. Treas. Reg. 108, § 86.10. But there is one marked
difference between value for estate and gift tax purposes and value for income tax
purposes. In transactions which involve the valuation of properties in the assessment of
income taxes, the regulations and decisions recognize that in some cases there may be
such a complete absence of any market with respect to property of substantial worth
as to require the deferring of the imposition of the tax until some later event or trans-
action occurs to which the mythical seller-buyer test is applicable. Cf. Helvering v.
Wallbridge, 70 F. 2d 683, 684 (C. C. A. 2d 1934), cert. denied, 293 U. S. 594 (1934).
But the very nature of an estate or gift tax requires a valuation as of a specific date
and place, whether or not there is any market. This inexorable demand of a valuation
if there is any value, however speculative, may mean that the difference in phraseology
in the Titles is not as inadvertent as has been supposed.




gift to the price fixed by the by-law the tax court said there was "but one mar-
ket, comprised of one buyer, the corporation, and the bylaw fixed the price in
that market ... and prevented the seller from asking or agreeing upon any more
and required the buyer to pay that price." 19 But the circuit court of appeals
held that the by-law price did not control. No one knew when the donor-
employee would discontinue his employment. Meanwhile the shares would be
entitled to dividends, and when he retired the book value would be different
from that at the time of the gift. It indicated that in addition to the existence of
the option, other factors to be considered were prospective earnings, the like-
lihood that the donor would not retire, his life expectancy, his power to change
the by-laws, and his opportunity to obtain corporate consent to sell to other
employees.
20
A similar result was reached in the Moore case. 2 1 There the petitioner had
created an inter vivos trust for the sole benefit of his wife. The property trans-
ferred to the trust consisted of shares of stock of a corporation which were held
under a stockholders' agreement that prohibited the owner from disposing of
the stock without first offering it at the adjusted book value to the directors in
their individual capacity and, if they refused it, then to the other stockholders.
All stockholders had consented to the creation of the trust upon the condition
that the-shares should still be subject to the restrictive agreement. The petitioner
returned the shares for gift tax purposes in his gift tax return reporting their
value as equal to the adjusted book value of $1,763.04 per share. The commis-
sioner on the basis of all relevant factors determined that the shares were worth
$3,636.34 per share and assessed a deficiency accordingly. It appeared that aver-
age annual earnings available for dividends and dividend payments over the pre-
ceding five-year period were $620.18 and $615.70 respectively. These earnings
and dividends were equivalent to a rate of 17% on the value of the shares as
found by the commissioner. In its opinion, the tax court said: "We think that
a security upon which a return of in excess of $600 per year can be realized for
a period of years, so far as anything can be seen to the contrary, has a value in
excess of the adjusted book value of the shares as determined under the re-
strictive agreement." 22
Here the use value, rather than the market value, was stressed. The worth
of property is not limited solely to its exchange value on sale; the ability to sell
is only one of the advantages of ownership. The right to share in company earn-
ings and participate in the control of company policies may in many instances be
of greater value. Further the likelihood of revision of by-laws, rescision of agree-
ments or waivers of their requirements in particular instances where all of the
parties are closely related by family or business ties justifies, if indeed it does not
demand, this realistic approach.
19. 2 T. C. at 703.
20. Commissioner v. McCann, 146 F. 2d 385 (C. C. A. 2d 1944).
21. Moore v. Commissioner, 3 T. C. 1205 (1944).
22. Id. at 1211.
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Thus there seems little likelihood of avoiding a difficult valuation problem
on a gift of such a business interest even if subject to option restrictions. And
where no accurate estimate of the tax is possible, the prospective donor may well
stay his hand. Further, where the property given consists solely of binding op-
tion rights created by the donor to purchase his interest after his death at a
favorable price, there is the additional deterrent that the full value of the proper-
ty at the date of death may be included in the gross taxable estate of the optionor
as a transfer intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after death,
thus necessitating a second valuation. As will be shown later, this type of gift,
like the flallock transfers,23 effects no reductions in estate taxes.
INcOME TAXES
While this article does not purport to deal thoroughly with the income tax
difficulties which may arise from the granting of stock options, the problem
should be noted. In Commissioner v. Smith,24 Smith as part compensation for
services, was given an option to purchase from his employer certain shares of
stock in another corporation at a price not then less than its market value. Two
years later when he exercised the option the market price had risen substantial-
ly. The difference between the market price on the date of purchase and the
amount paid by Smith pursuant to the terms of the option was held to be ad-
ditional compensation and therefore taxable income to him.
At the time it was given, the option had no readily measurable value' since
the option and market prices were identical. Without an option Smith could
have bought as cheaply as with one. But the option contract had real economic
worth. With no investment of capital, Smith stood to benefit by increases in
the price of the stock without any risk of loss. The theory of the Supreme Court
was that since "the option was not found to have any market value when given,
it could not itself operate to compensate" Smith but merely represented a means
of securing to him future compensation. The Court indicated that the problem
might have been different had the option had a market value at the time it was
given. It further recognized that an option may be property in the hands of the
option holder for some purposes. "When the option price is less than the market
price ... it may have present value and may be found to be itself compensation
for services rendered." 25
Thus the creation of the option if the consideration is personal service may
subject the holder to immediate income tax if the present worth of the shares
23. Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106, 60 Sup. Ct. 444, 84 L. Ed. 646 (1940).
24. 324 U. S. 177, 65 Sup. Ct. 591, 89. L. Ed. 830 (1945). In connection with this
case, see generally, Bastedo, Taxing Emnployees dn Stock "Purchases," 41 COL. L. REV.
239 (1941); Notes, 50 HARv. L. REv. 500 (1937), 1 TAx L. REv. 225 (1946); Baker,
Stock Options for Executives, 19 HARv. Bus. REv. 106 (1940); Dillavaou, Employees'
Stock Options, 20 AccouNTING REv. 320 (1945) ; Seghers, Stock Purchase Options under
the New Treasury Rules, 81 J. OF ACCoUNTAMcY 452 (1946).
25. 324 U. S. at 181.
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measurably exceeds the market price or if the option itself has market value.
Since the receipt of the option under such circumstances constitutes a taxable
event, no further income tax should be assessed on any subsequent increase in
the value of the property between the date of the option and the date of its
exercise. However the point is still unsettled and such authority as there is
looks the other way.2 In any event, the decision in the Smith case seriously
limits the effective use of the option device in situations similar to the Bensel
case. 27 There the father to induce his son to continue in the employ of his con-
trolled corporation gave the latter an option to purchase the father's shares on
his death. The option price was held to control the estate tax value. But in view
of the probable income tax consequences where the option may be found to be
,compensation for services the present practicability of such an arrangement to
freeze estate tax values is doubtful. If all increase in the value of the stock be-
tween the date of the option and the date of purchase must be included as part
of the optionee's taxable income and taxed at ordinary rather than capital gains
tax rates because received as payment for services, the optionee will in the great
majority of cases find that his potential income tax liability makes the exercise
of the option economically prohibitive. Even where the price fixed is less than
the current market value and the recipient pays income tax immediately on the
difference, there is no certainty that the Treasury will not assess additional in-
come tax when the option is exercised.2 8 In addition to the income tax pitfalls a
finding of any substantial difference between the option price and the economic
worth of the interest may suggest the likelihood of a transfer for less than full
and adequate consideration in money or money's worth, and thus come within
the ban of Section 811 (c) of the Estate Tax Title, discussed below.
ESTATE TAXES
Here under some circumstances the pertinent vahlation factors may differ
from those involved in inter vivos transactions. When the restriction originates
from someone besides the owner and permits the owner to transmit his stock at
death to other stockholders, employees or members of his immediate family,
without first offering it to the optionee at the price fixed, the valuation problem
is identical with that presented by the inter vivos gift cases discussed above. His
beneficiary, even though he continues to be bound by the agreement, will enjoy
all of the benefits of ownership other than full sale rights. Therefore, there is no
reason to limit the value to the option price. The time and circumstance of any
future sale are uncertain. The existence of the option may have a depressing
26. Van Dusen v. Commissioner, 166 F. 2d 647 (C. C. A. 9th 1948); T. D. 5507,
1946-1 Cum. BULL. 18; I. T. 3795, 1946-1 Cumx. BULL. 15.
27. 100 F. 2d 639 (C. C. A. 3d 1938).
28. Van Dusen v. Commissioner, 166 F. 2d 647 (C. C. A. 9th 1948); T. D. 5507,
1946-1 Cum. BULL. 18.
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effect on value but this is only one of the many factors to be considered. In
Worcester County Trust Co. v. Commissioner 29 the court held that a provision
in the articles of incorporation that shareholders desirous of transferring shares
should first offer them to the directors, who might buy them for the use of the
corporation at their book value, did. not fix the market-value of the stock but
that such restriction would have a depressing effect upon its value in the market
and should have been considered in fixing the value for estate tax purposes.
"The taxpayers contend that the effect of this amendment is to fix the market
value of the stock at its book value. The Board, however, took the position that it
had no effect whatever on market value. With respect to it the Board said: 'Only if a
shareholder chose to sell was he required to make an offer to the corporation at book
value of the time. The corporation had no absolute right to demand sale-it had, no
"call"--which fixed the price at which the shareholder could be required to sell. If
the corporation wanted his shares before the shareholder wanted to sell at book value,
it could dicker with him for a price and book value would not be a determinant of the
price. He and the corporation would be the ordinary willing seller and buyer, and fair
market value would be the price upon which they would agree, with a presumed knowl-
edge of the facts. The restriction leaves the value unaffected and only restricts the field
of available purchasers in the first instance, if the shareholder should wish to sell. It
cannot be said that such a restriction necessarily affects the fair market value.'
"We cannot agree with taxpayers that the amendment set the value of the shares
at their book value on the critical date. The amendment did not prohibit sales of the
stock except at book value, nor did it fix book value as a call price at which at the
behest of the corporation the stock must be sold. It fixed a limitation on the price ob-
tainable by a shareholder for his shares only if he wished to sell and if the corporation
at that time wished to buy. The Board's comments quoted above dispose of the tax-
payers' contention. But we do not believe that the Board was correct in saying that
the 'restriction leaves the value unaffected' for the reason that it 'only restricts the field
of available purchase in the first instance.' In our view it must be said that the restriction
necessarily has a depressing effect upon the value of the stock in the market.
"A commodity freely salable is obviously worth more on the market than a precisely
similar commodity which cannot be freely sold. To be sure the restriction does not affect
the value of the stock so lohg as the owner does not wish to sell, but it is not this value
which, under the regulations, is to be used as the basis for computifg the tax. The
value to be used for this purpose is 'the fair market value,' at the critical date, that is
the 'price at which the property would change hands between a willing buyer and a
willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or to sell.' While it may be
true that the stock of the Company was so held that decedent's son could, and maybe
would, force a vote of the directors waiving compliance with the restrictions in the
event that the petitioners wished to sell, still the fact remains that the stock in a buyer's
hands would be subject to the restriction and there is nothing to indicate that in his
hands the directors would be disposed, or could be forced, to waive for his benefit. Upon
purchase, then, a buyer would own a stock which if he ever elected to sell, he might
well have to sell at book value, and this undoubtedly would tend to reduce its value on
the market. It seems to us that in reason it must be said that the restriction affected
the market value of the stock, and this being so it should have been considered as one of
the 'relevant factors having a bearing' on that question." "o
And where the restriction whether stemming from decedent or another re-
29. 134 F. 2d 578 (C. C. A. 1st 1943).
30. Id. at 581.
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quires his estate to sell all of the shares owned at his death to another at an
agreed price but does not hamper their free transferability during his life, the
full value of the shares will be included in his gross taxable estate for the reason
that the optionee's rights arise only with, and solely because of death.3 1
The types of agreements discussed above are to be distinguished from the
contracts or options which give the optionee a vested right to purchase the
property on death. Where decedent was not the creator of the option but merely
owned the burdened property at his death, the stipulated price governs. Since
the restriction is in no way traceable to decedent this situation has presented no
difficulty and caused no litigation. If on death the employee's estate must sell to
the employer at a predetermined price that price is the maximum value of this
property to his estate, even though it had a greater value while he lived and
enjoyed its other-than-sale benefits. The situation here is analogous to owner-
ship of a life estate. True, if the employer fails to exercise the option, the de-
cedent's beneficiaries will be enriched. But the enriching event is the failure to
exercise the option, not the death; and this has all the earmarks of an inter vivos
gift. The courts have properly held that the waiver of such rights is not signifi-
cant in fixing the estate tax value.
32
The difficult problem presents itself when the decedent created the option
in an inter vivos transaction. Here, as illustrated by the cases noted in the open-
ing paragraph of this article, the option device may be used to freeze values at
death. But the developing law in the field suggests limitations on its use. The
significance of Section 811(c) in taxing transfers intended "to take effect in
possession or enjoyment at or after death," has only been hinted at in the
opinions. 33 But the scope of that Section and the disastrous consequences to
the estate of one who retains a reversionary interest in an inter vivos gift, hbw-
31. Estate of Mathews v. Commissioner, 3 T. C. 525 (1944) ; Hoffman v. Connis-
sioner, 2 T. C. 1160 (1943).
32. Wilson v. Bowers, 57 F. 2d 682 (C. C. A. 2d 1932).
33. Cf. Commissioner v. Bensel, 100 F. 2d 639 (C. C. A. 3d 1938) ; Armstrong's
Estate v. Commissioner, 146 F. 2d 457 (C. C. A. 7th 1945) ; Hoffman v. Commissioner,
2 T. C. 1160, 1178 (1943) ; Estate of Strange, P-H 1942 TC MEm. DEC. SERV. f1 42,247
(1942). See also, PAUL, SUPPLEMENT To FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION § 18.34
(1946): "And in conclusion, a distinction should be noted between valuation for estate
tax purposes and valuation for gift tax purposes. In the latter type of valuation, one is
simply obtaining the value of property at the date of gift. There is no question, as there
may be'in connection with estate tax valuation, whether an optional arrangement is in
effect a transfer by the decedent 'intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at
or after death' within the meaning of Section 811 (c) of the Code. This question has
been suggested in some cases, and it may be that an option price in favor of a natural
object of the decedent's bounty may be held to have the quality of a testamentary gift
or legacy in the absence of a sale or adequate consideration in money's worth during
decedent's lifetime. This phase of the subject needs further development and will no
doubt receive consideration in future decisions."
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ever nominal and unintended, as illustrated by the Spiegel opinion,34 may well
prove troublesome in this type of stock-option situation.33
Assume that a father owning 500 shares and his son owning 100 shares
in a corporation enter into an agreement that neither will offer his shares for
sale without giving the other a first opportunity to buy at book value less
whatever worth may be attributable to good will and that in the event of the
death of either the other may purchase the decedent's interest within 90 days at
the same price.
That the father may have made a taxable gift immediately suggests itself.
The consideration is clearly disproportionate. What the son has given up with
his lesser number of shares, and longe- life expectancy, is measurably and sub-
stantially less than what he gained. While his rights under the agreement are
contingent they would bring many times what the father's rights would bring in
the open market. The relationship normally precludes the supposition of an
arm's-length transaction. Because the rights acquired by the father are sub-
stantially less than the consideration given, a taxable gift in the amount of the
difference results.3 6 Under the agreement the father retains his stock interest
until death. Only at that time will the rights created by the contract in favor
of the son come into enjoyment. This, of course, would be equally true were the
transaction between strangers at arm's-length and the consideration given by
each substantially equal; but Section 811 (c) is, by its very words, inapplicable
to transfers for a full and adequate consideration in money or money's worth. 7
34. Spiegel's Estate v. Commissioner, 69 Sup. Ct. 301 (1949). The settlor's possible
reversionary interest in the $1.000,000 trust corpus in this case had a value of $70
at the time of his death. Nevertheless a tax of $450,000 was assessed thereon because
the court held that the retained interest required the inclusion of the full value of the
corpus of the trust, not the value of decedent's interest therein.
35. Reliance may not be placed on Commissioner v. Childs' Estate, 147 F. 2d 368
(C. C. A. 3d 1944). In that case Mrs. Childs in 1935 had granted to her stepson an
option for ten years to purchase 400 shares of H. Childs & Co., Inc., for $10 per share.
The option recited that he had managed and operated the company since 1917, had
rendered exceptional services during the depression and that she desired to give him
an opportunity to increase his holdings. At the time of her death the option was still
outstanding and unexercised. The fair market value of each share was then $100. The
Tax Court found an estate tax value of $10 per share. P-H 1943 TC MEA. DEc. SEav.
ff 43,320 (1943). The case is peculiar in that Commissioner failed to raise any question
as to the validity of the option in view of the possible absence of consideration or to
urge upon the court the applicability of Section 811 (c). While these points were raised
on appeal the circuit court of appeals refused to consider contentions not advanced in
the court below.
36. INT. REV. CODE § 1002.
37. "Transfers in contemplation of, or taking effect at death. To the extent of any
interest therein of which the decedent has at any time made a transfer, by trust or
othervise, in contemplation of or intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at
or after his death, or of which he has at any time made a transfer, by trust or otherwise,
under which he has retained for his life or for any period not ascertainable without
reference to his death or for any period which does not in fact end before his death
(1) the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the income from, the property,, or
(2) the right, either alone or in conjunction with any person, to designate the persons
who shall possess or enjoy the property or the income therefrom; except in case of a
bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth." INT.
REV. CODE, § 811(c).
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Because of the gift element in the father-son contract, the full value of the shares
at the date of death must be included in the father's gross taxable estate.
The results reached in the decisions noted in the opening paragraphs of
this article may still be regarded as sound holdings with the possible exception of
the Lomb opinion.38 In the Bensel case,39 the father and son dealt at arm's
length and the value of the option "was high" 40 in relation to the worth of the
stock at the time of the contract. Thus there was no element of gift or inadequacy
of consideration and hence Section 811 (C) [then 302 (c) ] was held inapplicable.
Similarly in the Strange case 41 the Tax Court found that "the option figure of
$10,000 was an adequate price for the stock on April 11, 1917," the date of the
original agreement. Therefore the option price rather than the fair market value
($238,126.56) of the shares on the date of death governed. The agreement in
the Lomb case appears to have been an arm's-length transaction. 42 It contained
substantial gift as well as sale restrictions 43 but query if the rationale of that
opinion has not been undermined by the later cases, 44 since the decedent could
within narrow limits bequeath the property in such a way as to stay the hand of
the optionee.
As the objective of many of these restrictive agreements is to keep owner-
ship in the hands of surviving partners, associates or stockholders and to avoid
the intervention of the deceased's beneficiaries or other outsiders, the contracts
will often be made at arm's length and the donative element which Section
811 (c) contemplates will be absent. But because close family and business ties
beget acts of generosity and because the line between the arm's-length trans-
action and the donative one may become shadowy in particular cases caution will
dictate that the interests of each participant in any restrictive" agreement be
impartially valued and where any plausible contention may be made that the
agreement may not have been at arm's length the parties will be well advised to
err on the liberal side in fixing the option price or formula from which it is to be
determined.
In addition to fixing the purchase price by reference to current market
worth, the consideration presently given to make the option binding must be
the fair monetary equivalent of the market value of the irrevocable privilege
to buy at a future date. In other words, the option itself has a value, as was
pointed out in the discussion of Commissioner v. Smith. With no investment
38. Lomb v. Sugden, 82 F. 2d 166 (C. C. A. 2d 1936).
39. 100 F. 2d 639 (C. C. A. 3d 1938).
- 40. 36 B. T. A. 246, 253 (1937).
41. P-H 1942 TC MEm. DEC. SERv. 1 42,247 (1942).
42. 11 F. Supp. 472, 477 (W. D. N. Y. 1935). "There is no evidence in this case,
nor is there any claim, nor can any inference be properly drawn, that the agreement in
question here was made for the purpose of evading taxation. Its sole purpose was
obviously to enable those who had built up Bausch & Lomb industry from its infancy
or their successors, to continue control of the corporation."
43. See note 3 supra.
44. Worcester County Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 134 F. 2d 578 (C. C. A. 1st
1943); Commissioner v. McCann, 146 F. 2d 385 (C. C. A. 2d 1944).
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of capital the optionee stands to benefit by price increases in the property with-
out the corresponding risks of loss by decrease in value, which ownership of
the property itself would entail.
CONCLUSION
Even when the owner of the property is the optionor, restrictive agree-
ments are frequently motivated by business or family reasons wholly unrelated
to tax consequences., And when tax considerations are present, the difficulty
sought to be avoided is almost always the uncertainty as to the value which may
be attributed to the property by the taxing authorities. Yet to use the option
device effectively and avoid disastrous tax consequences one must be a skilled
mariner, and since there are places along the way where the visibility is
reminiscent of Nashville smog, even the expert may- lose his bearings.
If he is wise he will chart a course wide of the rule of Commissioner v.
Sniith.45 The arrangement must negative any implication that smacks of com-
pensation for services or is otherwise a substitute for payments which would
constitute taxable income to the recipient. Failing this the game will rarely be
worth the candle, for the income tax incurred will generally be found to ex-
ceed any estate tax eliminated.
The conclusion is something of a paradox. If the estate tax objective is to
be achieved, no gift tax must be incurred. Any inter vivos arrangement under
which A may purchase an interest of B on the latter's death, unless the option
is given in exchange for a full and adequate consideration in money or money's
worth, will result in the imposition of gift tax and the subsequent inclusion of
this property in B's gross taxable estate at its full value at the date of death as
though the option were non-existent. Conversely, an arrangement which escapes
the gift tax will limit estate values to the option price no matter how wide the
discrepancy at death between the option price and its real value. That the re-
strictive option device may be effectively used within the limits suggested finds
support in the regulation dealing with the valuation of business interests.
"Special attention should be given to fixing an adequate figure for the value of
the good will of the business in all cases in which the decedent has not agreed,
for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth, that his in-
terest therein shall pass at his death to his surviving partner or partners." 46
45. 324 U. S. 177, 65 Sup. Ct. 591, 84 L. Ed. 646 (1945).
46. U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.10(d).
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